A Trans-Tasman business elite? by HARRIGAN, Nicholas & GOLDFINCH, Shaun
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
12-2007
A Trans-Tasman business elite?
Nicholas HARRIGAN
Singapore Management University, nharrigan@smu.edu.sg
Shaun GOLDFINCH
University of Otago
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783307083231
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HARRIGAN, Nicholas, & GOLDFINCH, Shaun.(2007). A Trans-Tasman business elite?. Journal of Sociology, 43(4), 367-384.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2096
A Trans-Tasman business
elite?
Nicholas Harrigan
Australian National University and University of Oxford
Shaun Goldfinch
University of Otago and American University of Sharjah, UAE
Introduction
Although the last 25 years have seen remarkable co-ordination and harmo-
nization of business policy across the Tasman, there have recently been a
number of notable ‘failed’ Trans-Tasman policy initiatives, including an
attempt to form a single banking regulator, and an attempt to merge the
Australian and New Zealand stock exchanges. The ‘failure’ of these har-
monization initiatives seems to reflect a divergence of interest between the
Australian and New Zealand business communities, as expressed, for
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Abstract
This article examines the close relationship between the Australian and New
Zealand business communities to ask whether the relationship is best charac-
terized as simply a bi-lateral trading relationship, or whether there is evidence
of the formation of a transnational business community. This article also seeks
to explore the nature of Australia–NewZealand integration, and specifically the
degree to which the relationship is interdependent or asymmetrical. Data are
drawn from quantitative sources – including a dataset developed from the
IBISWorld’s Largest 2000 Enterprises in Australia and New Zealand, Who’s
Who in Australia, and Who’s Who in Business in Australia – and qualitative
sources, including interviews with business and policy elites. Our findings are
that the relationship between the Australian and New Zealand business com-
munities is much deeper than a bi-lateral trading relationship, but also falls
short of forming one transnational community. We also find that the relation-
ship is substantially asymmetrical in nature, raising concerns among a number
of New Zealand business executives about New Zealand sovereignty.
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example, in the concerns of the New Zealand business community about
abandoning sovereign control over their banking system which is 90 per
cent Australian owned. However, concerns at the stalling of the harmo-
nization agenda have also led business leaders on both sides of the Tasman
to initiate deeper and more comprehensive policy dialogues such as the
Australia–New Zealand Leadership Forum. This Forum has managed to
garner the support and attendance from the highest level business and polit-
ical leaders from both sides of the Tasman since 2004.
This article is motivated by an attempt to understand these two possi-
bly contradictory developments: continuing Trans-Tasman policy conflict,
and deeper Trans-Tasman policy engagement. We do so from the perspec-
tive that these tensions are driven by economic and sociological causes,
and in particular, from the very special, multi-dimensional relationship
between the Australian and New Zealand business communities. Although
it is not controversial to suggest that there is a close relationship between
these two communities, it is not clear how this relationship should be char-
acterized and what its effects on public policy are. To what extent are the
connections between the business communities more than just a bi-lateral
trading relationship? To what extent is there a tendency towards the for-
mation of a Trans-Tasman business community similar to that found in the
European Union (Fligstein and Merand, 2002) or within unified nation
states? And, can the relationship be said to be an ‘equal’ or ‘fair’ one, and
in what senses?
This article examines these questions drawing on published and primary
material, qualitative interviews and a dataset developed from the
IBISWorld’s Largest 2000 Enterprises in Australia and New Zealand 2006,
Who’s Who in Australia 2005 and Who’s Who in Business in Australia
2005. The article begins with an overview of our methods and datasets. It
then attempts to characterize the integration of the Australian and New
Zealand business communities along five major dimensions: (1) business
culture; (2) trade, investment and ownership; (3) managerial elites; (4) busi-
ness policy elites; and (5) business policy.
Methods
Discussions of the political sociology of Australian business have tended to
be framed either in terms of the concept of business ‘elites’ or in terms of a
business or capitalist ‘class’ (Gilding, 2004). Both concepts are valid and
useful for describing different aspects of national and transnational busi-
ness communities. We use the phrase ‘national business community’ in a
way that is largely synonymous with previous use of the phrase national
business ‘class’, and define it as comprising all major owners and senior
managers of large and medium-sized businesses in that country. We distin-
guish this from business ‘elites’, by which we mean the set of individuals
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who come into leadership positions of major organizations of the business
community, both economic, such as corporations, and political, such as
business associations (Burton and Higley, 1987).
This article is based on qualitative and quantitative data. Elite qualita-
tive interviews were carried out in Sydney and Auckland during late 2004
and late 2005. Interviewees were selected because of their ‘Australasian
nature’ such as senior New Zealand executives working in different
Australian banks; for their focus on the Trans-Tasman relationship – such
as the Trans-Tasman Business Circle, TradeNZ and business consultancy –
or for their centrality to other Trans-Tasman debates such as the debate
over the possible share market merger. They were asked a common set of
questions but with opportunity for broader discussion. These were supple-
mented both by further interviews for another study, which asked different
questions, but touched on similar themes. A total of 11 interviews were car-
ried out. All interviews were taped and fully transcribed. Interviews lasted
from one to one-and-a-half hours.
The quantitative analysis draws from a dataset developed by Harrigan
(2006). It integrates IBISWorld’s Largest 2000 Enterprises in Australia and
New Zealand (2006), Who’s Who in Australia 2005 (Crown Content,
2005a) and Who’s Who in Business in Australia 2005 (Crown Content,
2005b). IBISWorld includes over 7500 directors (both executive and non-
executive directors) holding over 10,000 directors’ positions in the Top
2000 corporations, and the 20 largest shareholders of each corporation.
Who’s Who includes biographies of over 33,000 prominent individuals in
Australia (and many from New Zealand). Each director in IBISWorld was
matched with their Who’s Who record (if they had one), giving approxi-
mately 4500 matches.
A subset of the IBISWorld firms was used, comprising the largest 53
New Zealand public listed corporations, and the 200 largest Australian
public listed corporations. This population represented all the public listed
New Zealand corporations in the IBISWorld dataset, and a comparable set
of Australian corporations.1 Nationality of corporations was established by
head office location. Nationality of ownership was established from the list-
ing of largest 20 shareholders in the IBISWorld dataset. A corporation was
classified as having ‘Australian’ or ‘New Zealand’ ownership if more than
5 per cent of its shares were owned by Australian or New Zealand individ-
uals and/or corporations. The nationality of directors was classified accord-
ing to country of birth, education or citizenship in either of the two Who’s
Who datasets. Directors who met the criteria for both Australian and New
Zealand ‘nationality’ were classified as both. Confidentiality and security
concerns from the data suppliers did not allow us to use place of residence
to establish nationality. As a result, and given that less than 50 per cent of
directors’ positions are listed in Who’s Who, estimates of Trans-Tasman
integration are conservative. Trans-Tasman Business Circle membership
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was downloaded from the organization’s website. Companies with a head
office in Australia were designated as having a ‘Trans-Tasman Directorship’
if one or more directors of the company held a director’s position in a com-
pany with its head office in New Zealand. The reverse was true for New
Zealand firms.
Business culture
The most obvious similarity between the Australian and New Zealand busi-
ness communities is what we might call their shared ‘culture’ or ‘values’.
There are many studies and surveys that support the argument that Australia
and New Zealand share a business culture. In Hofstede’s (cf. Hofstede and
Hofstede, 2005) various heavily cited studies of business cultures, Australia
and New Zealand rank very closely. The Globe Study of middle managers
across 62 nations puts New Zealand and Australia in the ‘Anglo-cluster’,
which in this study includes the UK, Australia, the USA, Canada and New
Zealand, plus South Africa and Ireland (Ashkanasy et al., 2002). In the
World Values Survey (2006) New Zealand and Australia are again ranked
very closely together in the Anglo or Anglo-American group – that is, the
UK, Australia, the USA, Canada and New Zealand. On measures of
corruption – in this case Transparency International – New Zealand and
Australia are somewhat apart but still close, with New Zealand ranked
(along with Iceland and Norway) as least corrupt, at an index score of 9.6,
while Australia ranked 9th at 8.7. In short, survey data suggest that it is hard
to find two business communities which – in cultural terms at least – are
more alike.
Interviews with prominent Australian and New Zealand business people
provided substantial evidence to support this finding, but, as would be
expected, the interviewees were able to point out nuances and exceptions.
Two key differences stood out. There was strongly held belief among the
New Zealand business executives and policy makers that we interviewed
that Australians are more bureaucratically inclined and rule bound. As a
Sydney-based New Zealand government official noted:
… if you focus on the similarities you start ignoring the differences, and you
ignore the differences at your commercial peril. And we therefore think that New
Zealand companies almost get lulled into a false sense of security by thinking
that Australia will be the same as New Zealand. And it’s not. It’s a much more
formal place to do business in. It’s much more bureaucratic. They’ve got many
more layers of government than we have. Companies tend to be more hierarchal
… which makes it very important to be able to identify the decision makers when
you are talking to companies and it may well be the people that you initially start
talking to aren’t.
It’s an incredibly networked market where things like old school ties count and
lots of relationships that start at school go on into business.
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One New Zealand business interviewee put this perceived more heavily
regulated environment also down to cultural differences:
You look up a law in New Zealand and a law in Australia. Their’s literally will
be kilos and kilos heavier in paper and it will tell you in great detail everything
you shall and shan’t do.
Australians … are both more … anti-authoritarian and you … get that sort of
larrikin rebel streak but at the same time they expect to be more heavily regu-
lated … they sort of expect to be sort of stepped on.
Whereas New Zealanders are, I think are more, in my experience, self-motivating.
There was also the belief that Australian business persons are more likely
to be corrupt. As one New Zealand business executive noted:
It’s quite a bit more corrupt so there are ways of getting things done which are
a little bit alien to us. You can talk to people in Sydney and they will show you
basically that to get a consent through for your housing operation in time ... basi-
cally you have to use the brown paper bag method – maybe there is a certain
amount of urban myth about it.
In Auckland … you can talk to people ’til you’re blue in the face and never find
anyone who has ever thought it was worth bribing a council official to get their
consent through.
Maybe we’re naïve and haven’t tried it.
These are, however, exceptions that prove the rule: the Australian and
New Zealand business communities share a remarkably similar culture.
This similar culture significantly underpins the other close relationships that
will be discussed in this article. There is a broader literature, which argues
that cultural and value differences (often linked to the term ‘psychic differ-
ence’) are often seen as a deterrent to foreign investment and other business
engagement (cf. Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul,
1975). In this case, one only needs to compare the cultural divide that sep-
arates Australia from New Zealand with the cultural divide that separates
Australia from either of its other geographically close neighbours – such as
Indonesia – or many of its other major trading partners, such as Japan. In
both cases, the lack of a common culture means that the relationship
between the countries’ business communities does not extend beyond that
of a bi-lateral trading and investing relationship.
Trade, investment and ownership
The pattern of trade, investment and ownership between the Australian and
New Zealand business communities is characterized by considerable inte-
gration and interdependence, but also substantial asymmetry. This asymme-
try can be the source of some tension. At the macro level, these two trends
– integration and asymmetry – are readily apparent. Australia is New
Harrigan & Goldfinch: A Trans-Tasman business elite? 371
Zealand’s most important export market, its leading source of investment
and also New Zealand’s most important destination for Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI). For Australia, New Zealand is a very important trading
partner and site for investment, but not to the same degree: for Australia, the
New Zealand market is more-or-less equivalent to an Australian state, it is
the leading destination for Australian manufactures, its third most impor-
tant destination for FDI and Australia’s six largest source of FDI (ABS,
2006). Despite this asymmetry, New Zealand is still very important to
Australian business strategy in certain industries. For example, New
Zealand accounted for a third of the total investments by Australian private
equity firms in 2005–6.
Drilling down to the firm level, a similar pattern is perceptible. As Table
2 shows, there is considerable Australian ownership of New Zealand com-
panies with over 30 per cent of the largest New Zealand companies having
5 per cent or more Australian ownership.2 As Table 1 shows, New Zealand
ownership of Australian firms is low in contrast, with only 2.5 per cent of
the largest 200 publicly listed Australian firms (a total of 5) having New
Zealand ownership of 5 per cent or more.
Case studies of individual industries illustrate the forms that this inte-
gration and asymmetry take. Australian presence in New Zealand banking,
notable since the mid-19th century, increased to dominance by the late 20th
century. By 2005, the top 5 banks in New Zealand were Australian con-
trolled, and 98 per cent of financial assets were with foreign-owned banks,
compared to 40 per cent in 1985. The top 5 banks owned 90 per cent of all
banking assets in New Zealand. New Zealand continues to be the most
important overseas market for Australian banks.
Retail, manufacturing, entertainment and media have also been targets
for Australian investment for much of the 20th century and into the 21st.
For example, John Fairfax Holdings publishes around 70 per cent of New
Zealand’s newspapers, magazines and sporting publications, since purchas-
ing Independent Newspapers Ltd (then majority controlled by Murdoch’s
News Corp by 2003) in 2003. Other media outlets – including radio and all
but one major New Zealand daily newspaper – are also Australian owned.
In 2005 the Australian company Woolworths Limited purchased what was
Progressive Enterprises Ltd from its then owner Foodland Associated
Limited, based in Perth, and continues to operate it as a subsidiary. In
2006, this company controlled 45 per cent of the New Zealand grocery
market. Recent purchases of well-known New Zealand companies and
brands have included Whitcoulls, Tegel (the leading poultry producer),
Griffin’s (the leading biscuit manufacture) and Kathmandu (a leading out-
door equipment retail chain), as well as hotel and business properties.
The traffic is not entirely one way. Fonterra – New Zealand’s largest
company – expanded into the Australian dairy industry acquiring leading
Australian dairy brands such as Bega, and controls over 20 per cent of
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Australia’s milk production. Lion Nathan relocated to Australia in 2000
and controls around 42 per cent of the Australian beer market. New
Zealand jewellery company, Michael Hill International spread from New
Zealand to open a shop in Brisbane in Australia in 1987, before expanding
to 180 shops across New Zealand, Australia and Canada by 2006. In con-
trast, an attempt by the Warehouse to expand to Australia from its New
Zealand base was widely regarded as a disaster and its 122 Australian
stores and other assets were sold to an Australian equity firm in December
2005. One top 100 Australian company – Ansett – nearly bankrupted its
New Zealand purchaser, Air New Zealand, and led to Air New Zealand’s
renationalization.
In summary, the pattern of investment, ownership and trade is char-
acterized by deep integration of the Australian and New Zealand busi-
ness communities, but an integration that appears to involve
considerable asymmetries. As we shall see later in this article, these 
asymmetries are sources of some tension in the Australia–New Zealand
business relationship.
Managerial elites
The phenomenon of business cross-border transnational ‘managerial elites’
circulating within and across nations, and within different levels of the
transnational operations of companies, has been noted in a number of stud-
ies across the world (Beaverstock, 2005; Castells, 2000). From the evidence
we have collected, it appears that managerial elites from Australia and New
Zealand demonstrate similar patterns of integration and asymmetry to
those found in other dimensions of the Trans-Tasman relationship. As
Tables 1 and 2 show, around one in seven of the largest Australian corpo-
rations have a director who also sits on the board of a New Zealand cor-
poration, while more than half of the New Zealand corporations share
directors with one of the top 200 Australian corporations.3
A similar trend exists in the origins of directors. More than 10 per cent of
the largest 200 publicly listed Australian corporations had at least one direc-
tor who is of New Zealand origin (as measured by New Zealand birth, cit-
izenship or education). Australian representation is considerably stronger in
the other direction with nearly 40 per cent of New Zealand listed firms hav-
ing at least one Australian director on their boards. This degree of integra-
tion is more strongly marked by state – NSW and Victoria are twice as likely
as the rest of Australia to share at least one director with a New Zealand
company. If we study the directors separately we find that just over 8 per
cent of all directors of New Zealand firms have Australian origins, while just
over 2 per cent of all directors of the top 200 Australian firms are of New
Zealand origin. Anecdotal and qualitative evidence suggest New Zealanders
and Australians are often highly represented at mid-management levels and,
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as such, not captured by our measures, and it is possible that the measure-
ment of interlocking directorships only may understate the depth of the links
between New Zealand and Australian business elites.
Qualitative sources provide a more detailed picture of these trends. The
New Zealand media are notable for the extent to which they report when
New Zealand-born executives are appointed to senior jobs in the Australian
business sector. Recent high-profile appointments include David Kirk as
chief executive of Fairfax and Ralph Norris as chief executive of the
Commonwealth Bank, but others have included the head of Australian Gas
Light Limited, chief executive of Channel Nine and the Halifax Bank of
Scotland, and, as the Director of the Trans-Tasman Business Circle noted,
‘quite a few chief financial officers of Westpac’. In contrast, there appears
to be considerably less fanfare or media coverage of the considerable num-
ber of Australian-born individuals who head companies and sit on boards
in New Zealand.
The asymmetry in the treatment of Australian and New Zealand execu-
tives on the other side of the Tasman can also be seen in the pressure on
New Zealand executives to play down their national identity. As one finan-
cial executive working in an Australian business noted:
I think one of the interesting things is that the Aussies that are [in New Zealand]
are more visible. Partly because if you’re a New Zealander and you want to suc-
ceed in Australia you generally play down your Kiwi identity. Kiwis who go over
there after they’ve been there four or five years many of them will take Australian
citizenship. There’s obviously some sort of pressure on them to conform to suc-
ceed over there – to be seen as an Australian.
Ironically, this asymmetry provides certain benefits to a small number of
New Zealand managers who rise to the top of the corporate ladder. The
dominance of Australian firms provides one avenue by which New
Zealanders can gain access to higher jobs in the Australian centre – Ralph
Norris, for example, was a former CEO of ASB bank, a subsidiary of the
Commonwealth Bank.
Business policy elites
The integration of Australian and New Zealand business elites extends into
a range of political organizations and policy formation processes, and the
degree of this integration appears to extend considerably beyond forms of
policy co-operation seen in many bi-lateral relationships. This has included
the involvement of a number of senior business leaders from both sides of
the Tasman in policy ‘entrepreneurship’, including funding studies on vari-
ous policy issues, initiating think tanks and building links between business,
policy and other elites (Goldfinch, 2000, 2002; Kelsey, 1995). Unity around
neoliberal ideology has provided an important linkage between some
Australasian business elites. Examples of this include the links between
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Roger Kerr of the New Zealand Business Roundtable and leading financial
business people in Melbourne, Sydney and elsewhere. Also important was
co-operation between one-time Deputy Governor of the New Zealand
Reserve Bank and former State Service Commissioner Roderick Deane, and
the Australian economist and neoliberal policy activist Michael Porter, who
together attempted, along with several leading business people, to establish
a Tasman University in 1987. This evolved into the Tasman Institute. The
Tasman Institute became an influential think tank based in Melbourne, and
included leading New Zealand business members, some of which sat on its
board of directors, and was partly funded by New Zealand business organi-
zations as well as leading Australian businesses.
More formalized, and less ideological, various business associations
provide important mechanisms for facilitating cross-Tasman policy co-
ordination. One of these is the Trans-Tasman Business Circle, self-
described as ‘the major executive network between Australia and New
Zealand’, providing various services, meetings and contacts. As can be
seen in Tables 1 and 2, 9 per cent of the top 200 Australian companies
and 13 per cent of New Zealand’s top corporations are members. The
Director describes the Circle as providing a ‘home for executives who are
either travelling to the other country [or] being relocated’ and giving
businesses
an opportunity to network and to profile what was happening between the
two countries [and] to have a forum where they can discuss what they’re
doing. They may … have operations in New Zealand [and] are Trans-Tasman
companies.
We do not speak on anyone’s behalf [but] we provide the forum for people to
lobby. But if the Prime Minister wants to speak or the Treasurer or the Reserve
Bank Governors want to talk to the business community in the other country,
then the Departments of Foreign Affairs use us as the forum.
Now if somebody wants to sidle up to them or lobby them or make a pitch …
The close co-ordination between business policy elites from Australia and
New Zealand can be seen in the activities of the recently formed
Australia–New Zealand Leadership Forum (and its close associate the
Australia–New Zealand Business Council).4 The formal impetus for the
Forum came from a letter in early 2004 by two of the most prominent busi-
ness leaders in Australian and New Zealand: Kerry McDonald, Chair of the
Bank of New Zealand, and Margaret Jackson, Chair of Qantas. This letter to
the New Zealand Prime Minister argued that the Australia–New Zealand
relationship had ‘plateaued’ and lost its momentum. These two business lead-
ers were key drivers of the subsequent Leadership Forums – the first in
Wellington in 2004, the second in Melbourne in 2005, the third in Auckland
in 2006 and the fourth held in Sydney in 2007. More than half the delegates
to the Forum were business representatives, with the remainder from
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government departments, policy institutes and academic and cultural areas.
Representation from both governments was at the highest level and included
the foreign ministers. The Forums included briefing papers outlining issues
for discussion and economic statistics, presentations, and specialist commit-
tees and working parties on particular issues, as well as opportunities for
social networking. Between Forums, a number of working committees were
formed to develop issues further – such as 23 working groups between the
2004 and 2005 conference. Despite attempts to broaden the discussion, the
agenda and discussion was one that favoured business and economic issues,
and provided broad support for moves towards a single market and general
harmonization, albeit with some reservations by New Zealand representa-
tives regarding sovereignty issues (Hempenstal, 2006).
There is some evidence that the Leadership Forums have facilitated or at
least made apparent the policy consensus existing among policy elites, par-
ticularly among business elites. Business members have given significant
weight to the idea of moving to a single market, despite some initial resis-
tance from New Zealand elites on some issues. Border control reforms had
resulted in common immigration queues for Australian and New Zealand
passport holders in both countries – a direct ‘win’ for Forum lobbying.
Work continued on tax and R&D regimes, consumer and commercial law,
intellectual property and facilitating labour exchange. The working parties
and other avenues for discussion continued to press for further integration
and harmonization.
In addition to these formal networks, interviewees acknowledged the
importance of informal networks based on common nationality. As a senior
business executive noted, in New Zealand ‘there’s a sort of an informal net-
work of Australian CEOs here, who get together … there’s like 30 people
and they’re all pretty visibly Australian’.
To sum, there is considerable evidence of integration of the Australian
and New Zealand business communities through the involvement of their
respective business elites in a range of Trans-Tasman business policy groups
and political forums.
Policy Convergence
Policy convergence across multiple levels also supports the development of a
more tightly integrated business community. Indeed, this convergence to
some extent reflects business support – both tacit and active – from both sides
of the Tasman for such convergence, albeit to sometimes differing degrees.
In a certain sense, Trans-Tasman policy convergence has been important
for over a century and a half. Institutional isomorphism went well beyond
the simple sharing of a British colonial heritage (Ward, 1987).5 Australia,
New Zealand and the Australian states since the 19th century have shared
policy ideas, policy innovations, legislation – and indeed policy personnel –
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to a remarkable degree. This was to the extent that a shared Australasian
model of state development developed and existed for much of the 20th
century. In turn, this model was dismantled in the 1980s and 1990s in a
rapid and comprehensive process of economic liberalization, which also
shared important characteristics (Goldfinch, 2000; Goldfinch and Mein-
Smith, 2006).
The most fundamental realignment and policy convergence between
Australia and New Zealand has been seen since the advent of the Australia
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement on 1 February
1983. CER is one of the most comprehensive free-trade agreements in exis-
tence and has seen the increasing harmonization of Australia and New
Zealand across a vast array of policy fields, as well as the mutual recognition
of each other’s different regulatory and legislative regimes. This harmoniza-
tion and mutual recognition has been carried out through such mechanisms as
joint intergovernmental committees, co-operation between Trans-Tasman
governmental agencies and regular meetings of ministers. A host of memo-
randums and agreements have been adopted by both governments. In 1986
New Zealand adopted competition law that reflected Australian examples,
and a 1988 protocol was adopted which eliminated the application of anti-
dumping laws. The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement, signed in
1996 and activated in 1998, allows any good legally sold in one jurisdiction
to be sold in any other. Any person registered to practise an occupation in one
jurisdiction can practise in any other. In 2000 a memorandum of understand-
ing on the Co-ordination of Business Law (updating an earlier 1988 memo)
was signed and affirmed by a Ministerial Forum held in 2003. The Open Skies
Agreement, confirming a single aviation market, was signed in 2002. In 2004
a Trans-Tasman Accounting Standards Group was established with members
from various accounting agencies and professional groups and representatives
from the Australian Treasury and the New Zealand Ministry of Economic
Development to establish similar accounting standards. The Australian
Productivity Commission’s recommendation to further integrate the two
countries’ competition and consumer regimes was endorsed by the New
Zealand Finance Minister Michael Cullen and the Australian Treasurer Peter
Costello in February 2005. In 2006 there were further moves to provide
mutual recognition and harmonize banking regulation, consumer regulation,
business taxation, securities law, among other things – and even to co-ordinate
the New Zealand Reserve Bank and the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority ‘especially in times of financial crisis’. A common currency is not
entirely ruled out, nor is a common border for customs and quarantine and
other rules. A single market remains the putative policy aim (Howard, 2006).
In sum, in terms of policy and institutional frameworks – particularly in busi-
ness, consumer and commercial law and the free movement of labour – there
are few business communities who are closer.
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Just as other dimensions of the relationship between the Australian and
New Zealand business communities contain asymmetries, so too does the
business policy. A number of Australian business people strongly support
a Single Economic Market, including one competition regime, a single
regulatory framework in commerce and banking, a merged stock
exchange and, according to some Australian business leaders, a common
currency – albeit the Australian dollar – although a currency union was
recently discounted by the New Zealand government (Jackson, 2004;
New Zealand Herald, 2004; O’Sullivan, 2004a, 2004b). However, while
many New Zealand businesses are basically in agreement with the thrust
for a single market, they are also more conscious of the potential loss of
sovereignty and often support greater harmonization and mutual recogni-
tion of regulatory systems rather than a single system (cf. Hawke, 2004;
NZ Treasury, 2005).
An important example of the tension over greater integration caused by
asymmetry in the Australia–New Zealand relationship is the case of moves
towards a single banking regulator. The Trans-Tasman Council on Banking
Supervision was formed in February 2005 to enhance co-operation and fur-
ther harmonize and/or mutually recognize the different regulatory regimes.
Senior Australian ministers have been explicit in linking broader integration
and a single banking regulator to a single economic market. Australian
elites have noted in interviews they bear New Zealand particular good will,
as one might a ‘little brother’, and that they have New Zealand’s best inter-
ests at heart. New Zealand regulators have shown less enthusiasm however,
and 14 ‘senior participants in the New Zealand banking system’ inter-
viewed by the New Zealand Treasury and Reserve Bank agreed with their
assessment (RBNZ, undated). Even senior New Zealand executives work-
ing in Australian banks have expressed reservations. As one noted in an
interview,
in the case of bank regulation, the Australian view is well look, all the banks in
New Zealand are basically Australian, mostly. And we’ve got an Australian reg-
ulator for Australian banks, then why don’t you just trust us on that one. That
sounds plausible but then you think okay, if you sign up to that, we could never
then regulate bank behaviour. And the Australian regulator, which is answerable
to Australian parliament and Australian people is regulating our bank system,
sure. So if the bank was to fail nobody is sitting there worrying about the effect
on New Zealanders.
So sovereignty, I think, is important and sovereignty can be an emotional word
but what it means to me is, you know, who’s looking after New Zealand?
Another banking executive made a similar point:
I don’t believe you can have one regulator. Common regulation would make
sense. But that’s differentiated as to whether its Australian regulation or it is
common regulation.
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… the Australian argument is oh but we’re all in favour of harmonization which
is a great idea for us both, so we’ll harmonize everything – it’s just that the first
issue is bank regulation. We’ll get to the other stuff later on. Well hang on, sorry
what about apples – that’s been going since 1918 you won’t allow our apples and
why don’t we deal … with that first.
Another example of a move towards greater integration that failed was
the merger of the Australian and the New Zealand stock exchanges. This
failure was despite extended debate on the matter and some support from
New Zealand governmental circles and from New Zealand businesses,
including 70 per cent of New Zealand fund managers (Money Management,
2000). The matter was dismissed in 2002 ostensibly because of concerns
regarding sovereignty and related issues (Hoare, 2002; NZPA, 2000). It is
something that rankles still with some Australian elites, with an Australian
stock exchange leader claiming in an interview that this would facilitate the
hollowing out of New Zealand as firms moved to where ‘the liquidity was’
(i.e. Sydney). This was also a reason often given by opponents of the merger.
There is some concern among business leaders in New Zealand that the
asymmetry of the Trans-Tasman relationship means that harmonization
simply results in ‘Australianization’. Indeed, the concern that a common
market – particularly one unaccompanied by a political union – may not
work in New Zealand’s interests is not only voiced by academics such as
Catley (2001), but one partly shared by some New Zealand business exec-
utives. As one business executive noted:
Harmonization with Australia is a very good thing as long as it’s actually on our
terms.
The downside … is that the Australian environment is [more] government and
regulatory environment plays such a larger part. I think one of the risks we pay
in New Zealand is we’ve imported a lot of Australian regulations. We’re harmo-
nizing more regulation, more compliance. I don’t think that’s a good thing; that’s
unproductive for our economy.
Harmonization is a great word but harmonization with a larger neighbour is
normally a takeover.
Another concern expressed by New Zealand business leaders is of
‘hollowing-out’ of New Zealand, as major companies relocate themselves to
Australia, or as New Zealand companies are absorbed into larger Australian
or other organizations. According to one business executive interviewed,
Australian businesses
… will apply a policy that works for their whole business but may not work in
New Zealand. When they want to build a call centre, they will say okay, in New
Zealand … wage rates are much lower, you know the staff I can recruit for the
same dollars might be better educated or whatever it is. But across my whole
business … my constituency really is in Australia and the New South Wales
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government or South Australian government is going to pay me some subsidy so
I’ll start the call centre in Australia.
Those sorts of opportunities tend to hollow out in local operations ... and really
New Zealand is just becoming more and more … a sort of a shop front.
Conclusion
The relationship between the Australian and New Zealand business com-
munities is characterized by deep, yet not complete integration. We have
argued that built on a common business culture, the relationship between
the Australian and New Zealand business communities is characterized by
substantial Trans-Tasman trade, investment, business ownership, inter-
locked directorships, closely co-ordinated business policy elites and a
remarkable level of policy convergence. Our results suggest that integration
is much more than simply a bi-lateral trading relationship, but nor are the
two business communities a single unified community. Further we find sub-
stantial evidence of asymmetry across multiple dimensions of the relation-
ship between the business communities, from patterns of ownership and
investment, to director interlocks and ‘harmonization’ legislation, much of
which seems to favour Australia because it is the larger player on a ‘level’
playing field. This asymmetry was seen by a number of the New Zealand
executives interviewed as a possible threat to New Zealand sovereignty seen
to place New Zealand in a vulnerable economic and political position.
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Notes
1 The measure of company size given in the IBISWorld dataset was total revenue
(a measure of turnover or sales). The ratio of the total revenue of the corpora-
tions in our 2 samples is (Australia: New Zealand) $A645 billion: $A52 billion,
or approximately 12.5:1. This ratio of total revenue represents a compromise
between the two primary measures used to compare the relative size of nations’
corporate sectors – market capitalization and GDP – neither of which was
entirely adequate for our purposes. The ratio of market capitalization (approxi-
mately $US1,151 billion: $US56 billion, or 20:1) is usually the preferred measure
for such analyses but in this case it understates the relative size of the New
Zealand corporate sector because many New Zealand firms are listed on the
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ASX and not the NZX. However, GDP (approximately $US645 billion: $US98
billion, 6.5:1) was felt to be inadequate as well, as it does not take account of the
concentration of capital in larger countries such as Australia. Our choice of a
ratio of 12.5:1 represented the half-way point between market capitalization
(20:1), and GDP (6.5:1) and is an attempt to balance the limitations of both
major measures.
2 Five per cent is thought of as a significant shareholding. Most countries have leg-
islation forcing owners with more than 3 to 5 per cent to declare themselves, as
this range is considered the threshold at which owners can have significant influ-
ence over management of the company. Seven of the top 20, and 44 of the top
100 New Zealand companies in 2002 were more than 50 per cent overseas con-
trolled. In 2006 foreign ownership of shares fell to 41.4 per cent from 44.3 per
cent in March 2005. Of the top 100 hundred Australian companies, 31 per cent
had a majority foreign ownership in 2002, a number that has remained largely
constant (Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002).
3 At least 1.5 per cent of Executives (executives who serve on the board of the cor-
poration, generally the CEO and Chief Financial Officer and sometimes other
executives) of the top 200 publicly listed Australian companies are of New
Zealand origin. At least 5 per cent of the Executives of the top New Zealand
companies are of Australian origin. This is likely to be a considerable under-
statement of the real situation, given the limits to our data.
4 The Australia–New Zealand Business Council was established in 1978 with sep-
arate arms in both countries. It has commissioned and published a series of
reports pushing for further integration, organizing meetings between business
and politicians, and has made regular submissions on government policy on this
issue. The Council was also actively supporting the establishment of what it
called a ‘Trans-Tasman Advisory Council’ which took shape in the form of the
Leadership Forums.
5 US models also influenced the Australian Commonwealth’s constitution. The
USA is also of course a former British possession.
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